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Proposals for Change in
the Administration of the
Antidumping Act
STEPHEN L. GIBSON
The Antidumping Act of 1921 as amended, ("the
Act")1 recently has been criticized on grounds of economic theory
and trade policy. Commentators on the Act have suggested extensive
statutory changes to create a more rational response to the concerns
that underlie the existence of an "antidumping" law.2
While statutory reform of United States antidumping law is needed,
improvement in the administration of the Act in its present form is of
more pressing importance. Administrative decisions under the exist-
ing Act are, in fact if not in theory, adjudications directed toward
identified foreign manufacturers 3 and specific imported products and
can result in the imposition of liability for substantial amounts of
additional duties upon United States importers. Given the particular-
ity with which determinations under the Antidumping Act apply, such
determinations should be made with the same concern for due process
and accuracy of result evident in other administrative proceedings
directed toward particular persons.
This article suggests changes that might be made in the administra-
tion of the existing Act to improve the efficiency of investigations and
the fairness of determinations under the Act in its present form. Most
of these suggestions are addressed to the Treasury Department's fair
value investigation, with only a few comments on the International
Trade Commission injury investigation phase. The ITC has developed
a framework for injury investigations that appears generally to be
both workable and acceptable to interested parties. Treasury's fair
value investigation, on the other hand, has tended to be more contro-
versial. This stems in part from the complicated factual issues that
necessarily must be dealt with in determining fair value and from the
fact that Treasury deals with those issues in a system of divided juris-
diction, with the United States Customs Service and the Office of the
Stephen L. Gibson is a partner in the law firm of Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin
and Kahn, Washington, D.C.
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General Counsel of the Treasury Department making separate, but
sometimes overlapping, determinations.4
SCHEDULING THE INVESTIGATION
Section 201(b) of the Antidumping Act requires that Treasury make
an initial fair value determination within six months after the publi-
cation of a notice of investigation. 5 If, during this period, Treasury
determines that reason exists to believe or suspect that the merchan-
dise under investigation is being sold at less than fair value, it must
publish a Withholding of Appraisement Notice along with its affir-
mative initial determination of sales at less than fair value. A final
determination as to whether less than fair value (hereinafter LTFV)
sales exist must be made within three months thereafter. 6
Under the Antidumping Regulations, 7 an affirmative determination
made at the end of the six-month investigation will be final, unless the
exporter and importer concerned request a six-month withholding of
appraisement.8 If Treasury grants the request, the initial determina-
tion is only tentative, and Treasury has three more months in which to
reach the final determination.
Given the statutory deadlines for Treasury's investigation, it is im-
perative that the time available be used efficiently. During the investi-
gation, Customs and Treasury set various deadlines applicable to the
foreign manufacturer and the complainants with respect to matters
such as the foreign manufacturer's response to the antidumping ques-
tionnaire and the filing of briefs in conjunction with the Treasury
hearing. However, no effective schedule seems to be applied to the
work that must be performed by Customs and Treasury. While Trea-
sury does establish an internal schedule for each antidumping investi-
gation, this schedule is not disclosed to the complainant and the for-
eign manufacturer, and it does not seem to be enforced internally.
As a result of delays within Customs and Treasury, a "hurry up
and wait" atmosphere often prevails in fair value investigations. For
example, valuable time may be wasted in awaiting Customs' issu-
ance of the initial questionnaire. The foreign manufacturer is re-
quired to make an intensive effort to meet the deadline established
by Customs for responding to the questionnaire. In part because of
the large number of antidumping cases, the casehandler may not be
able to turn to the questionnaire response when it is received, and a
few weeks may pass before the detailed Customs analysis is begun.
When the response finally is analyzed by Customs and Treasury, it is
possible that the manufacturer may be faced with last minute re-
quests for additional information. If the manufacturer is unable to
provide the information within the short time allotted by Treasury,
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there is the possibility that Treasury will invoke its "best available
evidence" rule and proceed to use other sources of information or
assumptions in making its fair value determination.
While the time allowed by the Act for the fair value investigation is
relatively short when one considers the complexity of the issues in-
volved, there is sufficient time for full and fair investigation if the
time is managed wisely. The following steps would help avoid the
last-minute crisis atmosphere that sometimes occurs in Treasury an-
tidumping investigations.
First, the Treasury internal schedule should be refined to provide an
orderly sequence of events with adequate time allowed for each stage
of the investigation. An example of such a schedule is set forth in table
1. The internal schedule should be viewed as establishing guidelines,
not deadlines, and it should be adjusted as experience dictates.
Second, at the outset of each antidumping investigation, Treasury
should provide to the foreign manufacturer, the United States im-
porter, and the complainant, copies of the guideline schedule, with
appropriate target dates filled in. These target dates should be flexi-
bly applied, taking into account developments in the particular case.
While the target dates would be subject to some change, as neces-
sary, having the sequence of events laid out in advance would assist
the parties in planning, and the target dates would provide criteria
for identifying the cause of any significant delays in the development
of the investigation.
Third, Treasury should be less restrictive in exercising its authority
under section 201(b)(2) to extend an investigation. That section pro-
vides that if the Secretary concludes that the initial determination
cannot reasonably be made within six months, he may extend the
deadline for the determination by up to three months. 9
There have been several cases in which Treasury has made revised
LTFV determinations after its final determination had been made
and the case referred to the ITC. 10 These late changes in the LTFV
margins indicate that the initial withholding decision in those cases
may have been premature, before Treasury had gathered and fully
analyzed the necessary facts, and therefore an extension under sec-
tion 201(b)(2) would have been appropriate. An extension under this
section would seem to be called for, particularly where delays are
caused by the inability of Customs or Treasury to meet their target
dates under the guideline schedule.
THE INVESTIGATION PROCESS
Consolidation of Functions
The formal Treasury determinations in antidumping proceedings are







Complaint accepted . ................................. day one
Customs investigation
Treasury decision ................................... 30 days
Full investigation








Disclosure .... ............................... 4 months
Election of 3-month or
6-month withholding .............................. 4/4 months
Treasury determination (3-month withholding)
Pre-hearing briefs
Statutory hearing ... ............................... 5 months
Post-hearing briefs
Withholding decision .. ............................ 6 months
Final affirmative
Tentative negative
Referral to ITC ... ................................. 6 months
Final negative ..... ............................ 9 months
Treasury determination (6-month withholding)
Treasury conference
Withholding decision ............................... 6 months
Tentative affirmative
Tentative negative
Disclosure re: tentative decision
Pre-hearing briefs
Hearing .. ...................................... 72 months
Post-hearing briefs
Final affirmative or negative
Referral to ITC ... ................................. 9 months
Note: This time-frame would provide guidelines which must be flexibly ap-
plied to respond to the needs of each particular case. If Treasury determines
at any time within the 6-month period prior to the withholding decision that a
decision cannot reasonably be made within six months, it can extend the
deadline for the withholding decision by up to three months. 19 U.S.C. §
160(b)(2) (1976). This would allow greater time for the remaining phases of
the investigation.
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Secretary of the Treasury." Presently, three separate government
offices are involved in gathering the facts and preparing a recom-
mended decision for the General Counsel. The manufacturer's re-
sponse to the antidumping questionnaire is verified (audited) at the
manufacturer's plant by a Customs field agent who is stationed over-
seas. Following the verification, the Customs agent prepares a report
and transmits the report and the manufacturer's questionnaire re-
sponse to Customs headquarters in Washington. There the verifica-
tion report and questionnaire response are analyzed by the Customs
case handler. The case handler then prepares a report of the Cus-
toms findings and a recommended determination. After approval by
the case handler's supervisors, the Customs recommendation is sub-
mitted to the Office of Tariff Affairs in the Treasury Department. The
Office of Tariff Affairs reanalyzes the case and submits its recom-
mendation to the General Counsel of the Treasury, who makes the
formal determination.
This fragmentation of the investigative process can result in un-
necessary duplication of effort and conflicting analysis. For example,
the Customs case handler may question whether information was
adequately verified, even though the Customs field agent who con-
ducted the verification felt that the information had been fully docu-
mented. The Treasury analyst might consider that additional infor-
mation is needed on a particular point, even though the Customs
case handler considered the point to be adequately supported. Or the
Office of Tariff Affairs might take an entirely different position than
Customs as to whether an adjustment should be allowed, and might
require that the fair value calculations be reworked.
The efficiency of Treasury antidumping investigations would be
greatly improved if fact gathering, verification, and analysis were
combined in a single office. Such a consolidation of these functions
would eliminate the duplication of effort, second-guessing, and last
minute changes of direction that sometimes occur under the present
arrangements.
In the absence of such consolidation, there at least should be closer
coordination between the Customs case handler and the Office of
Tariff Affairs analyst during the Customs fact gathering investiga-
tion.12 For example, the Office of Tariff Affairs should review the
questionnaire response and the verification report when they are re-
ceived by Customs, rather than awaiting the formal Customs report
and recommendation. In this way, the Office of Tariff Affairs would
be able to raise any questions, and indicate its views, at an early
stage of the investigation. If either Customs or the Office of Tariff
Affairs concluded, from their joint review of the response and verifi-
cation report, that further information were needed, this information
then could be requested by Customs in a timely manner.
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The Disclosure Conference
In March, 1978, Treasury revised the Antidumping Regulations to
formalize the practice of providing disclosure conferences at which
Customs discloses the preliminary results of the investigation to rep-
resentatives of the foreign manufacturer and of the complainant.13
The revised regulation, however, made a significant change from
prior practice, by providing that the disclosure conference will be
held only before the final determination. As a result, where six-
month withholding of appraisement is applicable there is no opportu-
nity prior to the withholding decision, made at the time of a tenta-
tive determination of sales at less than fair value, for the foreign
manufacturer or the complainant to be informed of the proposed
Treasury action.
The withholding of appraisement can have an immediate adverse
effect on the foreign manufacturer and the United States importer,
since it makes further entries of the merchandise subject to possible
assessment of dumping duties in the event of a dumping finding. As
a result, upon withholding of appraisement, importers may be re-
quired to post an additional bond on imports to cover this potential
liability. 14 These added costs and risks may cause importers to avoid
further purchases of the merchandise, thus terminating or greatly
restricting the manufacturer's sales to the United States.
Since the withholding of appraisement can have such a direct im-
pact on the manufacturer and importer, due process requires that
they be provided a meaningful opportunity to learn the basis for, and
to comment on, a proposed withholding of appraisement before the
withholding decision is made. The present disclosure conference
regulation, which denies this opportunity where six-month withhold-
ing is applicable, should be changed to provide for prewithholding
disclosure and comments. This change would not seem to impose an
undue burden on Customs or Treasury, inasmuch as there already is
not only disclosure, but also a full hearing and briefing, prior to the
withholding decision where six-month withholding of appraisement
has not been requested.
In explaining its new disclosure regulation, Treasury described the
purpose and significance of disclosure conferences as follows:
These conferences are a means for providing information to
interested persons concerning the bases for the Treasury De-
partment's determinations.
Under present procedures, after Customs has initially re-
viewed the available data for determining foreign market value
or constructed value and purchase price or exporter's sales
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price, as applicable, and has made any tentative adjustments
considered appropriate, interested persons may request a disclo-
sure conference to discuss the tentative calculations and adjust-
ments. The calculations and adjustments discussed at the con-
ference, however, are subject to further analysis and review by
the Treasury Department before a tentative or final determina-
tion is published in the proceeding.
Because of the complex issues of fact and law involved in an-
tidumping proceedings, the Treasury Department has concluded
that meaningful disclosure on the bases for a tentative determi-
nation is possible only after the analysis and review process is
completed. Ample time is provided thereafter for the presenta-
tion of information and views. 15
As this notice indicates, the disclosure conference is intended to
provide information concerning the preliminary determinations of
the Treasury Department (i.e., the Office of Tariff Affairs), which
may involve changes from the Customs analysis. It is, therefore,
somewhat incongruous that the disclosure conference continues to
be the responsibility of Customs. Since the purpose of the disclosure
conference is to explain the conclusions reached by the Office of
Tariff Affairs, the conference should be conducted by that Office, not
Customs.
PRICE ADJUSTMENT CALCULATIONS
The Act and regulations provide that, in making a fair value determi-
nation, the price charged by the manufacturer for merchandise ex-
ported to the United States will be compared on an ex-factory basis
with the ex-factory prices of the same merchandise sold by the
manufacturer in its home market, or, if there are insufficient home
market sales, in third country markets. If no home market or third
country sales exist, or such sales are determined to be below the cost
of production, fair value is calculated on the basis of constructed
value, as defined in the statute. 16 In basing fair value on home mar-
ket or third country sales, adjustments are to be made to take into
account price differences resulting from differences in circum-
stances of sale between the foreign market (i.e., home market or
third country) and United States sales; adjustments also are to be
made for physical differences between the merchandise sold in the
foreign market and that exported to the United States. 17
The Treasury rules dealing with differences in merchandise and
differences in circumstances of sale arbitrarily and unfairly limit the
nature and amount of adjustments that will be recognized. These
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rules were adopted for the administrative convenience of Customs
and Treasury in the belief that arbitrary rules ease verification and
analysis of claimed adjustments. This approach not only is contrary
to statutory requirements; it is also inefficient and unnecessary,
since cost accounting principles provide a neutral and reliable basis
for quantifying claimed adjustments.
Differences in Circumstances of Sale
Adjustments for differences in circumstances of sale presently are
provided for in section 153.10 of the regulations.18 Examples of dif-
ferences for which allowances will be made include differences in
credit terms, guarantees, technical assistance, servicing, and certain
advertising and selling costs. However, recognition of adjustments
for these differences is subject to a qualification under section
153.10(a), which states: "Differences in circumstances of sale for
which such allowances will be made are limited, in general, to those
circumstances which bear a direct relationship to the sales which
are under consideration."
The exact meaning of this "direct relationship" test is unclear, and
it has been applied inconsistently by Treasury. 19 In some cases, Trea-
sury has required that the cost of differences be demonstrated on a
bookkeeping basis. That is, the adjustment has been denied where the
manufacturer apparently could not demonstrate that a particular ex-
penditure was incurred in connection with the sale under considera-
tion.20 This bookkeeping approach unfairly results in denial of adjust-
ments for actual cost differences that can be identified through cost
accounting techniques. For example, suppose that a manufacturer
provides extensive technical assistance, such as tests and consulta-
tions which assist the customers in using the product, to its customers
in the home market, and that no charge is made for such services.
Assume further that the manufacturer provides no technical assis-
tance to United States purchasers of the product. The manufacturer
can identify, through cost accounting procedures, the per-unit cost of
providing technical assistance in the home market. Rational pricing
policy would require that the manufacturer include this cost in his
home market price, where it is reflected in the value to the customer,
while not including such costs in the price of sales for export to the
United States. Thus, in adjusting the home market sales price to re-
move the price element due to the technical assistance, one normally
would make an adjustment in the amount of the average per-unit cost
in the home market of providing such assistance.
However, the Treasury Department usually has taken the position
that an adjustment for technical assistance will be allowed only
where it can be demonstrated that particular technical assistance
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costs were incurred with respect to the particular transactions being
analyzed. 21 Recognition of an adjustment for technical assistance in
such a case becomes purely a matter of happenstance. While the
manufacturer does not vary his price from sale to sale based on
whether or not technical assistance was provided in connection with
a particular sale, the Treasury adjustment does work in this manner,
leading to arbitrary and unpredictable results.
In calculating the selling price of exports to the United States for
comparison with fair value, a deduction is made for any commissions
paid on the sales, and in an exporter's sales price situation for any
selling expenses incurred in the United States in conjunction with
the sales. To place the foreign market sales (home market or third
country, as appropriate) on a comparable basis, it is necessary also to
deduct the full amount of commission or selling expenses incurred
on those sales in calculating foreign market value. Section 153.10(b)
of the regulations recognizes an adjustment for home market or third
country selling expenses, but places a cap on the amount of the price
adjustment permitted. In general, this provision permits an adjust-
ment to foreign market value only in the actual amount of the home
market or third country selling expense, or the amount of the United
States selling expense or commission, whichever is less. Thus, while
the regulation recognizes that selling expenses may differ between
United States and home market or third country sales, it establishes
a one-sided rule that denies an adjustment for differences in selling
expenses where the foreign market selling expenses are greater than
the selling expenses or commissions in the United States market.
Treasury should abolish the direct relationship test and the selling
expense cap and should recognize adjustments for differences in cir-
cumstances of sale to the extent that the amount of those differences
can be demonstrated and quantified by cost accounting analysis. 22
This change would not only promote fairness in the Treasury deter-
mination of fair value, but it would also eliminate time-consuming
disputes as to the meaning and application of the direct relationship
test. Cost accounting principles are used in antidumping investiga-
tions in determining cost of production, in calculating the selling
expense adjustment on United States sales, and in determining con-
structed value. Such principles also should apply to the calculation of
cost differences due to differences in circumstances of sale.
Differences in Merchandise
The Act permits foreign market value to be based on the price of
merchandise in the home market that differs from the merchandise
sold in the United States market, where identical merchandise is not
sold in the two markets. 23 In such a situation, the Act requires that
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due allowance be made for differences in price or value resulting
from the physical differences in the merchandise.2 4 Section 153.11 of
the Regulations provides that, in making due allowance for differ-
ences in merchandise, "the Secretary will be guided primarily by the
differences in cost of manufacture ... but, when appropriate, he
may also consider the effect of such differences upon the market
value of the merchandise.
25
The statutory focus of the adjustment is upon the effect of the
difference on price, not cost. However, it may be difficult objectively
to ascertain the effect of merchandise differences upon price, where
both versions of the merchandise are not sold in the same market.
Therefore, differences in cost of manufacture may aid in determining
the effect of the differences in merchandise upon price or value.
While the Regulations could be interpreted in a manner consistent
with the statutory requirement, Customs and Treasury have adopted
a rigid policy in applying this provision of the Regulations in a man-
ner contrary to the Act. Under a rule announced in recent decisions,
Treasury limits the amount of adjustment for differences in mer-
chandise to the cost of labor, material, and direct factory overhead
attributable to such differences. No allowance is made for other ele-
ments that normally enter into the calculation of price, or market
value, such as selling expenses, warranty expenses, general over-
heads and normal profit.26
If the price or value of the product as a whole includes overhead
and profit, in addition to labor and material costs, then the calcu-
lated value of any portion of that product, representing the difference
between the home market product and the export product, also
should include all of those elements.27 The impact of the arbitrary
Treasury rule can be demonstrated in the following example: Sup-
Table 2.
Costs and Profits of Two Models of a Product
Home Market
Model Export Model
Direct cost (material and fabrication) 75 60
Indirect cost (general overhead
and selling expense)--33% of
direct cost) 25 20
Total cost 100 80
Profit (25% of total cost) 25 20
Selling price 125 100
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pose a manufacturer produces two models of its product-a deluxe
model, sold only in the home market, and an economy export model,
sold only to the United States. Assume, further, that the manufac-
turer uses a neutral rule to price its products, and the costs and profit
on the two models are as shown in table 2.
Inasmuch as the prices for the export model and the more expen-
sive home market model have been set on a neutral basis, the differ-
ence between the home market price and the export price is not the
result of price discrimination, but is due solely to differences between
the home market and export merchandise. Under a rational price
adjustment method, which took into account all elements of price on
a pro rata basis, the home market price, after removing the amount
of the price attributable to the differences between the machines,
should be the same as the price of the export model, as follows:
Difference in direct cost 15
Indirect cost (33% x 15) 5
Profit (25% x 20) 5
Adjusted home market price 125 - 25 = 100
However, under the policy applied by Treasury, an adjustment
would be made only in the amount of the direct cost attributable to
the difference in merchandise. In the example, this would result in a
10 percent dumping margin.
Home Market model 125
Adjustment (direct cost
difference) 15
Adjusted home market price 110
Export model price 100
Dumping margin 10+ 100 = 10%
The Treasury rule, which gives rise to such artificial margins,
should be changed. Treasury apparently adopted this rule because of
a lack of confidence that it could adequately analyze and verify
claimed adjustments which include elements other than direct cost.
However, an analysis of overhead and indirect costs is included in
calculating cost of production, and an analysis of such costs and
profit is necessary in calculating constructed value. There is no rea-
son why these concepts should be excluded in making due allowance
for differences in merchandise.
In summary, the fairness and efficiency of the fair value investiga-
tion would be greatly improved if Treasury would abandon the spe-
cial arbitrary rules it has developed for calculating adjustments and
instead would use commercially acceptable accounting and pricing
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principles in determining the price effect of differences in circum-
stances of sale and differences in merchandise.
Section 201(a) provides that, upon notification by the Secretary of the
Treasury that a class or kind of foreign merchandise is being or is
likely to be sold in the United States at less than fair value, the Inter-
national Trade Commission must determine within three months
thereafter "whether an industry in the United States is being or is
likely to be injured, or is prevented from being established, by reason
of the importation of such merchandise into the United States."
The Act does not set forth criteria for determining what constitutes
injury, and the decisions of the Commission in past antidumping
cases have not provided significant precedents to further clarify the
meaning of the injury test.28 Typically, such decisions have recited
statistical information developed by the Commission staff in the
course of the investigation and then stated a determination as to
whether or not the Commission found injury. While the opinions
have emphasized those portions of the statistical information that
tended to support the Commission's finding of injury or no injury,
they normally have not contained much reasoned explanation of the
Commission's determination.
Recently this situation has changed somewhat. Some of the opin-
ions show a greater effort to respond to the arguments presented by
the parties at the hearing and to state principles of general applica-
bility that might be relied upon in future cases.2 9 However, Commis-
sion decisions still do not contain the degree of legal and factual
analysis that one routinely finds in judicial opinions. As a result,
Commission determinations continue to appear to be based largely
on subjective considerations of what constitutes injury. It remains
difficult, therefore, to predict how the Commission might decide a
particular case, and there is little explanation to reconcile apparently
inconsistent decisions. Commission opinions should provide a more
complete explanation of the reasons for the decisions reached, ad-
dressing the issues presented by the parties at the hearing and in
their briefs, with a view to distilling principles and interpretations
that could have precedential value in future cases.
As an alternative to developing case law precedent, the Commis-
sion might consider defining injury criteria by regulation. So far, the
Commission has not attempted to do so, but it has held open the
possibility that definition of statutory terms and interpretive stan-
dards might be developed by rule making at some future date. 30
Whether through rule making or by a conscious effort to write opin-
ions having precedential value, the Commission should develop more
objective standards for determining whether or not injury or likeli-
hood of injury exists.
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For purposes of judicial review, antidumping determinations gener-
ally are treated the same as normal Customs duty determinations,
and review of such determinations is lodged with the Customs Court.
An American manufacturer may challenge the failure to assess anti-
dumping duties pursuant to procedures set forth in section 516 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 31 which also applies to challenges of
normal Customs classification or rate of duty determinations. Pursu-
ant to section 210 of the Act, an importer's challenge to dumping
determinations is raised by filing a protest to the assessment of spe-
cial dumping duties. 32 Such a protest is given the same treatment
under the law as a challenge to valuation in normal Customs duty
cases. If the protest is denied, the importer must pay the duties as
assessed in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Customs Court.33
Upon review, the importer bears a double burden of proving that the
Customs assessment was wrong and then of proving the correct for-
eign market value and United States purchase price or exporter's
sales price, including the detailed calculations of adjustments for
any differences in merchandise and differences in circumstances of
sale. 34 The Customs Court may also consider challenges to the dump-
ing finding,35 but the ability of the Customs Court to provide an ade-
quate remedy in the event it finds an error in the Treasury fair value
determination or the Commission injury determination is subject to
considerable doubt.
36
In short, the present Customs Court procedures are entirely un-
suited to dealing with the complex issues that can arise in antidump-
ing cases. The challenge to a special dumping duty may include.
constitutional due process issues and questions as to the validity of
the Treasury regulations, the proper application by Treasury of the
Act and Regulations to the particular facts, and the procedural and
legal correctness of the Commission's injury determination, in addi-
tion to questions concerning the correctness of foreign market value
and purchase price or exporter's sales price calculations on particu-
lar importations.
To provide more meaningful and efficient judicial review, section
210 of the Act should be amended to specifically provide Administra-
tive Procedure Act (hereinafter APA) review in antidumping cases.37
Jurisdiction for such review might be lodged either in the Customs
Court or in Federal district courts. Under a revised Section 201, any
person who filed an appearance at the Treasury fair value hearing or
the ITC injury hearing would be entitled to appeal the Treasury or
ITC decision by filing an appeal with the appropriate court within
sixty days after the determination that is the subject of the appeal,
except that an appeal of an affirmative finding of sales at less than
fair value would be appealable only in an appeal of the finding of
dumping. 38 The appeal would be tried pursuant to the applicable
150 Antidumping Law
provisions of Chapter 7 of Title 5 of the United States Code, and the
Court would have authority to issue an injunction or to remand the
matter to Treasury or the ITC, as appropriate, with instructions to
proceed in a manner not inconsistent with the decision of the Court.
Further, under this proposal, appeals from assessments of special
dumping duties would be separate from appeals related to the find-
ing of dumping. As under the present law, the determination of the
appropriate Customs officer as to foreign market value or con-
structed value, purchase price, or exporter's sales price, and the ac-
tion of the Customs officer in assessing a special dumping duty,
would be subject to the right of protest. Thereafter, judicial review
would be subject to APA standards and procedures as in the case of
the suggested appeal procedures for antidumping investigation de-
terminations. Recognizing that complicated factual issues can arise
in calculating foreign market value, the Court would have the au-
thority to remand the matter to the administrative agency; many of
these issues would be resolved more efficiently by remand than by
trial de novo in the Customs Court.
Because of the magnitude of duties that may be at issue in Anti-
dumping Act cases, the "admission ticket" provision requiring pay-
ment of duties to invoke Customs Court jurisdiction should be
dropped. Instead, APA procedures for permitting or staying adminis-
trative action pending appeal would be applicable.
CONCLUSION
There is room within the scope of the existing Antidumping Act for
substantial improvements in the conduct of antidumping investiga-
tions. It is hoped that the discussion in this article provides useful
ideas for making administration of the Antidumping Act fairer and
more efficient, as well as shedding light on current administrative
practices under the Act.
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contained in section 321 of the
Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
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Italy, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom, 43 Fed. Reg.
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14. 19 C.F.R. § 153.50, 153.51
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cated in 19 U.S.C. §§ 161(b),
(c), 164, 165 (1976). The Regu-
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153.18 (1977).
17. 19 U.S.C. §§ 161(b), (c),
170a(3)(A) (1976); 19 C.F.R.
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tory overhead costs, not for dif-
ferences in general overhead,
other fixed costs, or profit.
27. 19 U.S.C. § 165 (1976).
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30. 42 Fed. Reg. 56,502 (1977).
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549 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
affg 404 F. Supp. 124 (D.D.C.
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